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Is corruption influenced by economic growth? Are legal institutions such as the
‘Right to Information Act (RTI) 2005’ in India effective in curbing corruption? Using
a panel dataset covering 20 Indian states for the years 2005 and 2008 we estimate
the effects of growth and law on corruption. Accounting for endogeneity, omitted
fixed factors, and other nationwide changes we find that economic growth reduces
overall corruption as well as corruption in banking, land administration, education,
electricity, and hospitals. Growth reduces bribes but has little impact on corruption
perception. In contrast the RTI Act reduces both corruption experience and
corruption perception.
Comparative Economic Studies advance online publication, 21 March 2013;
doi:10.1057/ces.2013.4
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INTRODUCTION
Is corruption influenced by economic growth? Are legal institutions effective
in curbing corruption? As corruption and economic growth are arguably
simultaneously determined, one key question is the issue of causation. Mauro
(1995) in his seminal contribution argues that corruption acts as a dis-
incentive for investments and as a result harms growth over the long run. He
uses the Business International indices on corruption, red tape, and the
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efficiency of the judicial system to measure corruption for the period 1980–
1983 in 70 countries. In contrast, here we compute corruption using a two-
step procedure and Transparency International data.1 First, we compute an
average of the percentage of respondents answering yes to the questions on
direct experience of bribing, using a middleman, perception that a depart-
ment is corrupt, and perception that corruption increased over time for eight
different sectors (banking, land administration, police, education, water,
Public Distribution System (PDS), electricity, and hospitals). Second, we
average these averages over all the eight sectors to generate one observation
per state and per time period. A higher value of the corruption measure
implies higher corruption.
The advantage of the Transparency International data over any other
dataset is threefold. First, the Transparency International data allow us to
examine the impact of economic growth and law on corruption in each of the
above-mentioned sectors separately. Second, it allows us to make a dis-
tinction between corruption perception and corruption experience. Third, it
also allows us to separate out the effects of growth on bribing and the use of a
middleman. No other datasets would allow us to undertake this empirical
exercise. However, the limitation is that it only offers a small sample size
relative to cross-country datasets on corruption.
By plotting the data in Figure 1 we indeed observe that economic
growth and corruption are negatively related across 20 Indian states and
over the period 2005 and 2008. However, the causality could run in both
directions. High levels of corruption and weak institutions could reduce
growth (Mauro, 1995). In contrast, one can also argue that economic
growth creates additional resources that allow a country or a state to fight
corruption effectively. Indeed, there is a large literature documenting
causality in both directions. Mauro (1995) argues that corruption acts as a
disincentive for investments and as a consequence limits growth.
Alternatively, rapid modernization of the economy improves institutional
quality and makes it easier for the state to detect, monitor, and punish
corruption (Lipset, 1960).2 Furthermore, rapidly growing per capita
income also increases the personal opportunity costs of corruption
(Treisman, 2000). To address endogeneity we use rainfall as an instrument
for economic growth.
1Note that Treisman (2000) in Table 1 (p. 411) reports a correlation of 0.87 between Business
International and Transparency International macro cross-country data.
2Note that Huntington (1968) disagrees with this view. He argues that rapid modernization
induces normative confusion at a time when the emerging economic elites are striving for power and
influence. As a result growth increases corruption.
S Bhattacharyya & R Jha
Growth, Law, and Corruption in India
2
Comparative Economic Studies
  
 
 
 
 
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
Theory suggests that the causal effects of GDP growth, per capita GDP
growth, and GDP levels on corruption could be different. Growth could
impact corruption by modernizing institutions and reshaping opportunity
costs and personal incentives (Lipset, 1960; Treisman, 2000). The effect could
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Number of obs. Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Corruption [cit] 40 32.3 11.6 16.8 59.1
Corruption in banks [cit
BANKS] 40 22.2 12.5 2.3 55.0
Corruption in land admin. [cit
LAND] 40 48.8 13.9 19.2 77.3
Corruption in police [cit
POLICE] 40 53.4 14.0 14.0 80.8
Corruption in education [cit
EDUC] 40 18.9 9.9 3.2 49.3
Corruption in water [cit
WATER] 40 29.3 11.95 4.1 54.0
Corruption in PDS [cit
PDS] 40 32.4 10.9 10.6 60.3
Corruption in electricity [cit
ELEC] 40 30.95 11.7 4.6 57.0
Corruption in hospitals [cit
HOSP] 40 30.8 10.9 9.6 57.8
Economic growth [ y^it ] 40 7.9 4.1 4.2 16.9
Log rainfall [ln RAINit1] 40 6.8 0.8 5.4 8.0
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Figure 1: Economic growth and corruption.
Note: State codes are available in the Appendix section ‘Data description’ . High value of the corruption
variable indicates higher corruption. The t-statistic for the slope of the line is 1.97.
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also be non-dynamic with levels of GDP rather than growth accounting for a
change in corruption (Hall and Jones, 1999). In this paper we focus on the
impact of GDP growth on corruption.
The second key question is how effective legal institutions are in curbing
corruption. Our panel dataset on corruption covering 20 Indian states and the
periods 2005 and 2008 offers an opportunity to empirically test this effect.
The Right to Information Act (RTI) in India came into effect on October 12,
2005, which is after the conclusion of our 2005 corruption survey in January.
The act ensures citizens’ secure access to information under the control of
public authorities. In addition, the accompanying Citizens’ Charter makes it
legally binding for all government agencies to publish a declaration incor-
porating their mission and commitment towards the people of India.
An obvious question is how RTI in India is linked to corruption. It is quite
common in India that citizens visiting some government offices for certain
legitimate services would either be not listened to or would be given a vague
response. On many occasions the officials would raise irrelevant objections to
simple applications for water connections. The government officials would
resort to such tactics because they are either seeking a bribe or hinting that
the citizen should pay a corrupt middleman to get the job done. Without these
payments, the application would be delayed under flimsy verbal objections
from the official.3 RTI empowers citizens to write a letter to the Public
Information Officer (PIO) of the relevant government department seeking
answers to questions such as why the application for a water connection is
delayed. Under the RTI Act the citizen is also entitled to ask for a daily
progress report on the water connection application, the names and
designations of officials with whom the application is lying during the time
under scrutiny, proof of receipt and dispatch of the application from the office
of each of these officials, what is the maximum time limit according to the
departmental rules for a water connection application to be processed, if
these rules are violated then which official is responsible, an official
assessment report on the possible violation of the published model code of
conduct of the department, and, if a violation has occurred, then what action
would be taken against the guilty. In the event of a citizen writing such letter to
the PIO, it becomes extremely difficult for the department to provide answers to
such probing questions within the RTI time limit without taking action against
the responsible officials. The department would also try to avoid situations
where an inadequate or delayed written response leads to the violation of the RTI
Act, which is punishable by law. Therefore, the general experience is that the job
is done without any further delay the moment a citizen files such a letter with the
3Note that the official would never present these objections in writing.
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PIO. The officials are also aware of the power of RTI, and, therefore, they are
much more cautious and less inclined to seek bribes.
By design, our dataset offers us the opportunity to test the effect of
the law on corruption using two time series data points in our dataset, one
before and the other after the law came into effect. Indeed, in Figure 2 we do
notice that corruption declined significantly in 2008. However, this may also
be due to some uncontrolled factors. The only way to find out is by
controlling for additional factors that may be influencing corruption.
In this paper, using a panel dataset covering 20 Indian states and the
periods 2005 and 2008 we estimate the causal effects of economic growth4
and law on corruption. Since different states have experienced different
growth patterns and different levels of corruption, India represents an ideal
testing ground to examine the link between economic growth and corruption.
To tackle endogeneity concerns we use rainfall as an instrument for economic
growth. We notice that rainfall is a positive predictor of growth. This is in line
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Figure 2: Corruption across states in 2005 and 2008.
Note: High value of the corruption variable indicates higher corruption. The line indicates period average
across states. State codes are available in the Appendix section ‘Data description’ .
4Note that the Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests reported in Table 2 indicates that the distribution of
corruption across states have changed over the two time periods. Forces such as economic growth
may be driving these changes.
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with the view that rainfall contributes positively to economic growth. Rainfall
perhaps also satisfies the exclusion restriction of an instrumental variable
(IV) as it shows very low correlation with factors such as inequality and
poverty through which, potentially, it could also affect corruption.5 To
capture the effect of law on corruption, we use a time dummy and control for
other nationwide changes that may be affecting corruption. This is a valid
strategy as the RTI came into effect after the completion of Transparency
International’s 2005 corruption survey. Our results indicate that economic
growth reduces overall corruption experience as well as corruption in
banking, land administration, education, electricity, and hospitals. It also
reduces overall bribes and bribes in the above-mentioned sectors. However,
growth has little impact on corruption perception. This is supportive of the
view that corruption perceptions in developing economies are often biased
upwards. In contrast, the RTI negatively impacts both corruption experience
and corruption perception. Our basic result holds after controlling for state
fixed effects and various additional covariates (eg literacy, Gini coefficient,
poverty head count ratio, mining share of state GDP, primary sector share of
state GDP, state government expenditure as a share of state GDP, newspaper
circulation, and total number of telephone exchanges). It is also robust to the
use of flood affected area, flood affected population, flood affected crop area,
Table 2: Kolmogorov–Smirnov equality of distribution test over time periods 2005 and 2008
Variable Kolmogorov–Smirnov
test statistic
p-values
Corruption [cit] 0.90 0.00
Corruption in banks [cit
BANKS] 0.45 0.02
Corruption in land admin. [cit
LAND] 0.80 0.00
Corruption in police [cit
POLICE] 0.95 0.00
Corruption in education [cit
LAND] 0.60 0.00
Corruption in water [cit
WATER] 0.45 0.02
Corruption in PDS [cit
PDS] 0.35 0.11
Corruption in electricity [cit
ELEC] 0.60 0.00
Corruption in hospitals [cit
HOSP] 0.70 0.00
Notes: The Kolmogorov–Smirnov non-parametric test is to test the hypothesis that distribution of
corruption across states over the two time periods (2005 and 2008) are identical. In other words, the null
hypothesis is H0:F2005(c)=G2008(c), where F2005(c) and G2008(c) are empirical distribution functions of
corruption across states in 2005 and 2008, respectively. The test statistic is defined as D ¼
max
0oco1
jF2005ðcÞ  G2008ðcÞj and can be compared with Table 55 of Biometrika tables, Vol. 2. If the
difference is large then it leads to rejection of the null hypothesis. Note that PDS stands for Public
Distribution System.
5More on this in the section ‘Empirical strategy and data’.
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and total number of flood affected households as alternative instruments and
outlier sensitivity tests.
We make the following four original contributions in this paper. First, by
using a panel dataset on corruption across Indian states and a Limited
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) IV estimation method we are able
to estimate the causal effect of economic growth on corruption. Controlling
for state fixed effects and additional covariates also allows us to tackle
potential omitted variable bias. To the best of our knowledge, ours is the first
panel data study of economic growth and corruption covering Indian states.
Second, using a time dummy and exploiting the construction of our dataset
we are able to estimate the corruption curbing effect of the RTI law in India.
This is an important finding that has policy implications not just for India but
also for other comparable developing economies suffering from endemic
corruption. To the best of our knowledge, no other empirical study on cor-
ruption in India provides evidence of this nature. Third, using sector-wise
disaggregated data we are able to estimate the causal effects of economic
growth and law on corruption in banking, land administration, police,
education, water supply, PDS, electricity, and hospitals. This in our view is an
entirely new finding. Fourth, we are able to separately estimate the effects of
economic growth and law on corruption experience and corruption per-
ception and we do find that they are different. We notice that economic
growth has very little influence on corruption perception. Our finding adds to
a small but growing body of evidence on the difference between corruption
perception and corruption experience (see Olken, 2009).
Our economic growth and corruption result is related to a large literature
on corruption and development that follows from the seminal contribution by
Mauro (1995).6 However, note that our focus here is to estimate the causal
effect of economic growth on corruption and not the other way around. Our
law and corruption result is also related to a growing literature on demo-
cratization and corruption as it emphasizes the role of accountability. For
example, Treisman (2000) shows that a long exposure to democracy reduces
corruption. Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2010), using a game theoretic model
and cross-national panel data, estimate a reduced-form econometric model
and show that resource rent is bad for corruption although the effect is
moderated by strong democratic institutions. In contrast, Fan et al. (2009)
show that decentralized government may not increase accountability and
reduce corruption if the government structures are complex. In a similar vein,
6Ades and Di Tella (1999), Rose-Ackerman (1999), Leite and Weidmann (1999), Dabla-Norris
(2000) are other important contributions in this literature. Bardhan (1997) provides an excellent
survey of the early contributions.
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Olken (2007) also shows that top-down government audit works better than
grassroots monitoring in Indonesia’s village roads project. Therefore, our
results contribute to a policy debate that is not only important for India but
also for other comparable developing economies. The estimates are not
directly comparable as there are significant differences in scale (micro-
economic or macroeconomic), scope (national or international), and nature
(theoretical, empirical, or experimental) of these studies.
Finally, our results are also related to a large literature on institutions and
economic development (see Knack and Keefer, 1995; Hall and Jones, 1999;
Acemoglu et al., 2001; Rodrik et al., 2004; Bhattacharyya, 2009). The major
finding of this literature is that economic institutions (such as, property
rights, contracts, regulation, and corruption) are one of the major drivers of
long-run economic development. Besley and Burgess (2000, 2004) provide
evidence that land property rights and labour market institutions have
significant effects on economic performance across states in India. In this
paper we estimate the magnitude of the relationship when causality runs in
the opposite direction from economic growth to institutions.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: the next section
discusses empirical strategy and the data. The section after that presents the
empirical evidence and various robustness tests. The last section concludes.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA
We use a panel dataset covering 20 Indian states and the periods 2005 and
2008. Our basic specification uses corruption data for the years 2005 and
2008. Economic growth for the periods 2005 and 2008 are growth in GDP7
over the periods 2004–2005 and 2007–2008, respectively. To estimate the
causal effects of economic growth and law on corruption we use the following
model:
cit ¼ ai þ dbt þ g1y^it þ X
0
itKþ eit ð1Þ
where cit is a measure of corruption in state i at year t, ai is a state dummy
variable covering 20 Indian states to control for state fixed effects, bt is a
dummy variable that takes the value 1 for the year 2008 to estimate the impact
of the introduction of the RTI Act (on October 12, 2005), y^it is economic growth
in state i over the period t1 to t, and Xit is a vector of other control variables.
7Note that we also use GDP per capita growth rate in Table 3 and our results are robust.
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A high value of cit implies a high level of corruption. The motivation behind
including state fixed effects is to control for time invariant state-specific fixed
factors such as language, culture, and ethnic fractionalization.
The main variables of interest are y^it and the time dummy variable bt.
Therefore g1 and d are our focus parameters. In theory, we would expect g1 to
be significantly negative as faster growing states are able to use additional
Table 3: Economic growth, law, and corruption
Dependent variable: Corruption [cit]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A
OLS estimates LIML Fuller IV estimates
Economic growth [ y^it ] 0.33*** 0.43***
(0.12) (0.14)
Year 2008 dummy 18.24*** 17.08*** 18.48*** 18.83***
(3.08) (2.59) (1.49) (1.92)
Per capita GDP growth 0.23** 0.39**
(0.11) (0.21)
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.07 0.06
Controls: State dummies
Instruments Log rainfall [ln RAINit1]
States 20 20 20 20
Observations 40 40 40 40
Adjusted R2 0.89 0.88
Panel B: First stage estimates
Economic growth [ y^it ] Per capita GDP growth
Log rainfall [ln RAINit1] 12.2* 14.7*
(6.55) (9.30)
F statistic 12.4 13.14
Stock–Yogo critical value 24.09 23.81
Partial R2 on instruments 0.009 0.018
Controls: State dummies, Year 2008 dummy
States 20 20
Observations 40 40
Adjusted R2 0.76 0.57
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, against a two-sided
alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors at the state level and they are robust to
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All regressions are carried out with an
intercept. Sample years are 2005 and 2008. Fuller’s modified LIML estimator with a=1 (correction
parameter proposed by Hausman et al., 2005) is used in Panel A, which is robust to weak instruments.
Endogeneity test for one or more endogenous regressors p-values are reported. The null hypothesis is that
the specified endogenous variables can actually be treated as exogenous. Under the null the test statistic
follows w2-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of regressors tested. Note that
Sargan overidentification test is not reported for columns 3 and 4 in Panel A as we have an exactly
identified system. Stock–Yogo critical value are based on LIML size and significance level of 5%. An
F-statistic below the level of Stock–Yogo critical value would indicate that the instruments are weak.
Partial R2 on excluded instruments are also reported, which measures instrument relevance.
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resources to curb corruption. The coefficient estimate d is expected to capture
the effect of the RTI Act. This is equivalent to a before and after estimation
strategy in panel data econometrics. Ideally one would like to compare the
effect of RTI on corruption before and afterwards in the areas affected by the
law, and then compare this to the effects before and afterwards in the areas
not affected by the law. Unfortunately this is not feasible here as the RTI law
came into effect nationally. In other words, there is no comparison group here
since the law was introduced at the same time in all locations. Nevertheless,
the strategy implemented here is credible at the macro level.
To illustrate the before and after strategy, let c1it be the corruption
outcome in state i at time t when the RTI Act is in effect. Similarly, let c2it1 be
the corruption outcome in state i at time t1 when the RTI Act is not in effect.
Note that these are potential outcomes, and in practice we only get to observe
one or the other. One can express the above as:
E½c1itji; t ¼ 1; y^it ¼ y;X
0
it ¼
X ¼ ai þ d and
E½c2it1ji; t  1 ¼ 0; y^it ¼ y;X
0
it ¼
X ¼ ai
ð2Þ
Given that E(eit|i, t)¼ 0. The population before and after estimates yields
the causal effect of the RTI Act d as follows:
E½c1itji; t ¼ 1; y^it ¼ y;X
0
it ¼
X  E½c2it1ji; t  1 ¼ 0; y^it ¼ y;X
0
it ¼
X ¼ d ð3Þ
This can be estimated by using the sample analog of the population
means. If the RTI law is effective in curbing corruption then we would expect
d to be negative.
Data on corruption are from the Transparency International’s India
Corruption Study 2005 and 2008. The study was jointly conducted by
Transparency International India and the Centre for Media Studies both
located in New Delhi. The survey for the 2005 report was conducted between
December 2004 and January 2005 and the survey for the 2008 report was
conducted between November 2007 and January 2008. The survey asks
respondents whether (i) they have direct experience of bribing, (ii) they have
used a middleman, (iii) they perceive a department to be corrupt, and (iv)
they perceive corruption has increased over time.8 These questions are asked
8Note that the survey asks some additional questions. However, they are not common over the
two time periods in our study. Therefore we are not including them here.
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to on average 750 respondents from each of the 20 states. Respondents are
selected using a random sampling technique covering both rural and urban
areas. In aggregate the 2005 survey interviews 14,405 respondents spread
over 151 cities and 306 villages of the 20 states. In contrast, the 2008 survey
covers 22,728 randomly selected Below Poverty Line (BPL) respondents
across the country. One could argue that this brings in issues of measurement
error that will bias our estimates downwards. This is formally known as the
attenuation bias, which is driven by measurement error. So what we estimate
in the presence of measurement error is in fact less in magnitude than the true
effect. Furthermore, if the measurement error follows all classical assump-
tions (in other words, random) then our estimates will remain unaffected.
Nevertheless, measurement error problem can be mitigated using the IV
strategy, and we remedy this problem using rainfall as an instrument. Rainfall
is geography-based and therefore exogenous or uncorrelated to the
measurement error. Hence rainfall can serve as a valid instrument to remedy
measurement-error-driven attenuation bias. The Appendix section ‘Measure-
ment error and instrumental variable estimation’ shows algebraically how the
IV strategy could potentially remedy the measurement error problem.
Our aggregate measure of corruption cit is computed in two steps. First,
an average is computed of the percentage of respondents answering yes to the
questions that they have direct experience of bribing, using a middleman,
perception that a department is corrupt, and perception that corruption
increased over time for eight different sectors: banking, land administration,
police, education, water, PDS, electricity, and hospitals.9 Second, these
averages are also averaged over all the eight sectors to generate one obser-
vation per state and per time period. Ideally, one should weigh the sectors
with their respective usages. But in the absence of reliable usage statistics at
the state level, we compute averages with equal weights. This may not be a
cause for concern as services from all of these sectors are widely used by
citizens. Note that the sector-level disaggregated data are utilized in Table 4,
and Table 5 treats corruption perception and corruption experience sepa-
rately. Corruption experience measure is the average of the questions on
‘direct experience of bribing’ and ‘using a middleman’. Corruption perception
measure is the average of the questions on ‘perception that a department is
corrupt’ and ‘perception that corruption increased over time’.
The state of Bihar turns out to be the most corrupt in our sample with
59% of respondents reporting corruption in 2005. In contrast Himachal
Pradesh is the least corrupt with only 17% of the respondents reporting
9Note that the India Corruption Study only reports these macro percentages and the underlying
micro data is not reported.
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Table 4: Economic growth, law, and corruption in different sectors
Corruption in
banks
[cit
BANKS]
Corruption in
land admin.
[cit
LAND]
Corruption
in police
[cit
POLICE]
Corruption in
education
[cit
EDUC]
Corruption
in water
[cit
WATER]
Corruption
in PDS
[cit
PDS]
Corruption in
electricity
[cit
ELEC]
Corruption in
hospitals
[cit
HOSP]
LIML Fuller IV estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Economic growth [ y^it ] 0.46** 0.96*** 0.33 0.60*** 0.85 0.11 0.76** 0.85***
(0.19) (0.20) (0.28) (0.13) (0.60) (0.44) (0.31) (0.18)
Year 2008 dummy 9.43*** 17.18*** 20.38*** 9.03*** 7.91*** 6.15* 11.55*** 12.78***
(3.13) (3.14) (2.71) (1.83) (2.86) (3.33) (2.48) (2.44)
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.06 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.06
Controls: State dummies
Instruments Log Rainfall [ln RAINit1]
States 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Observations 40 40 39 40 39 40 40 40
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster
standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All regressions are carried out with an intercept.
Sample years are 2005 and 2008. Fuller’s modified LIML estimator with a=1 (correction parameter proposed by Hausman et al., 2005) is used, which is robust to
weak instruments. Endogeneity test for one or more endogenous regressors p-values are reported. The null hypothesis is that the specified endogenous
variables can actually be treated as exogenous. Under the null the test statistic follows w2-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
regressors tested. Note that Sargan overidentification test is not reported as we have an exactly identified system.
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Table 5: Effect of economic growth and law on corruption experience and corruption perception
Corruption
experience
overall
Corruption
experience
in banks
Corruption
experience in
land admin.
Corruption
experience
in police
Corruption
experience
in education
Corruption
experience
in water
Corruption
experience
in PDS
Corruption
experience
in electricity
Corruption
experience
in hospitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: LIML Fuller IV estimates with corruption experience
Economic growth [y^it] 0.92*** 0.77*** 1.66*** 0.19 0.87*** 0.80 0.13 0.97*** 1.79***
(0.21) (0.25) (0.59) (0.58) (0.09) (0.87) (0.37) (0.29) (0.34)
Year 2008 dummy 17.09*** 11.55*** 29.25*** 12.09*** 7.55*** 7.65** 10.39*** 11.04*** 7.22***
(2.05) (2.19) (4.99) (4.49) (1.47) (3.81) (3.31) (1.93) (2.74)
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Controls: State dummies
Instruments Log rainfall [ln RAINit1]
States 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Observations 40 40 40 39 40 39 40 40 40
Corruption
perception
overall
Corruption
perception
in banks
Corruption
perception in
land admin.
Corruption
perception
in police
Corruption
perception
in education
Corruption
perception
in water
Corruption
perception
in PDS
Corruption
perception
in electricity
Corruption
perception
in hospitals
Panel B: LIML Fuller IV estimates with corruption perception
Economic growth [y^it] 0.21 0.11 0.83 0.72* 0.64* 0.84 0.05 0.62 0.22
(0.36) (0.45) (0.62) (0.37) (0.34) (0.96) (0.65) (0.54) (0.41)
Year 2008 dummy 15.35*** 14.42** 12.17*** 14.27*** 14.54*** 12.47*** 6.67 19.14*** 18.12***
(2.86) (5.95) (4.11) (3.69) (2.77) (4.73) (4.44) (3.83) (2.59)
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.06
Controls: State dummies
Instruments Log rainfall [ln RAINit1]
States 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Observations 40 40 40 39 40 39 40 40 40
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster
standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All regressions are carried out with an intercept.
Sample years are 2005 and 2008. Fuller’s modified LIML estimator with a=1 (correction parameter proposed by Hausman et al., 2005) is used, which is robust to
weak instruments. Endogeneity test for one or more endogenous regressors p-values are reported. The null hypothesis is that the specified endogenous
variables can actually be treated as exogenous. Under the null the test statistic follows w2-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
regressors tested. Note that Sargan overidentification test is not reported as we have an exactly identified system.
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corruption in 2008. It appears that police, land administration, and PDS are
among the most corrupt sectors in our dataset. Kerala and Himachal Pradesh
come out to be the least corrupt states in most of the cases. In contrast Bihar,
Jammu and Kashmir, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan register high levels of
corruption.
Economic growth y^it is defined as the growth in real GDP of the states
over the periods 2004–2005 and 2007–2008, respectively. We use real GDP as
our preferred measure instead of real GDP per capita to compute growth rates
because aggregate growth of the economy (modernization effect) is more
likely to have an impact on corruption at the macro level than per capita
growth. Nevertheless, we also use per capita GDP growth to estimate the
model and our results are robust. Real GDP growth data are from the Planning
Commission. Our growth variable varies between4.2% in Bihar in 2005 and
almost 17% in Chhattisgarh in 2005.
As economic growth here is arguably endogenous, one key question is
the issue of reverse causation. Corruption, as argued by many including
Mauro (1995), may dampen growth through the investment channel. In that
case, a simple OLS estimate of our model would be biased. In order to
estimate the causal effect of economic growth on corruption we need to
implement the IV estimation strategy. In particular, we need to identify an
exogenous variable that is correlated with economic growth but uncorrelated
with the error term eit in the model, that is, this exogenous variable would
affect corruption exclusively through the economic growth channel. This is
commonly known as the exclusion restriction. Indeed, finding such a variable
is a challenge in itself. But we are fortunate to have log rainfall (ln RAINit1)
from the Compendium of Environmental Statistics published by the Central
Statistical Organization. We notice that ln RAINit1 is positively related to
economic growth and the relationship is statistically significant. This is in line
with the view that rainfall positively contributes to economic growth.
Furthermore, ln RAINit1 is geography-based and therefore is exogenous.
However, rainfall may affect corruption through channels other than
economic growth. Poverty and inequality are such examples. Rainfall may
lead to reduction in poverty, which may in turn lead to a reduction in
corruption. Better rainfall and better agriculture growth may also increase
inequality leading to an increase in corruption. In such a situation the rainfall
instrument may not satisfy the exclusion restriction. To eliminate such
possibility, we check the correlation between the rainfall instrument and
poverty and inequality. It turns out to be 0.17 and 0.38, respectively, which
suggests it is unlikely that rainfall would affect corruption through the
poverty and inequality channels. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that ln
RAINit1 can serve as a valid instrument. However, if the relationship
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between ln RAINit1 and y^it is not strong enough then it may lead to the weak
instruments problem. Staiger and Stock (1997) and Stock and Yogo (2005)
show that if the instruments in a regression are only weakly correlated with
the suspected endogenous variables then the estimates are likely to be biased.
Instruments are considered to be weak if the first stage F-statistic is less than
Stock–Yogo critical value. The LIML Fuller version of the IV method is robust
to weak instruments. We implement the LIML method to estimate our model.
Moreover, we operate with a relatively small sample of 40 observations and
the LIML estimates are robust to small samples. Therefore, the risk of a
significantly large bias due to weak instruments is minor.
Finally, another potential concern is about the power of the diagnostic
tests with limited degrees of freedom. LIML estimates adopted here are best
suited for this purpose as they have robust and powerful small sample
properties. Nevertheless, we also perform the following two tests to be
certain about the validity of our conclusions. First, we adopt Hendry et al.’s
(2004) least square dummy variables approach and our results are robust.
This method can be implemented using the following two steps. The first
step is to estimate the model using LIML and identify all the statistically
insignificant state dummy variables. Then the second step is to re-estimate
the model using LIML but without the statistically insignificant state
dummies. The advantage is that this significantly improves the power of
the tests. Second, we estimate the model without any state dummies and
our results are robust. These results are reported in columns 9 and 10 of
Table 7.
The time dummy is used to capture the effect of the RTI Act. One can
certainly dispute whether our time dummy is solely picking up the effect of RTI
and Citizens’ Charter. It is possible that other nationwide changes introduced
around this time are also affecting corruption. In that case the estimate on the
time dummy is also picking up the effects of factors other than the RTI. Even
though plausible, it is hard to identify significant national policy changes
during this time other than the RTI that may affect corruption. Nevertheless, to
tackle this issue we also control for literacy, Gini coefficient, poverty head
count ratio, mining share of GDP, primary sector share of GDP, state
government expenditure, newspaper circulation, and total number of telephone
exchanges as additional control variables. Therefore it is perhaps safe to say
that d is indeed capturing the effects of RTI.
Detailed definitions and sources of all variables are available in Appendix
section ‘Data description’. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the major
variables used in the study. The Appendix section ‘Sample and state codes’
provides a list of 20 states covered in the study and presents a map of Indian
states.
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Table 2 reports Kolmogorov–Smirnov test results for the equality of
distributions of corruption over the time periods 2005 and 2008. The test
shows that the distribution of corruption across states has changed over the
two time periods. This may be driven by the variation in economic growth
across states. In Table 3 we try to ascertain this by estimating equation 1 using
OLS and LIML Fuller IV methods. Column 1 reports the OLS estimates and
column 3 presents estimates of the model using ln RAINit1 as an instrument
for economic growth. Our suspicion that economic growth can be
endogenous is supported by the endogeneity test reported at the bottom of
column 3. We notice that economic growth has a negative impact on
corruption. Ceteris paribus, one sample standard deviation (4.1% points)
increase in economic growth in an average state would reduce corruption by
1.8% points. In other words, our model predicts that an increase in the
growth rate of Bihar from 4.2% in 2005 to 16% in 2008 would reduce
corruption from 59% in 2005 to 50.3% in 2008. According to our dataset,
Bihar’s actual corruption in 2008 is 29%. Therefore, the estimated coefficient
on economic growth explains 29% of the actual decline in corruption in Bihar
over the period 2005–2008.
The coefficient on the year 2008 dummy captures the effect of RTI. Our
estimates suggest that RTI has a negative impact on corruption and the effect
is statistically significant. In particular, ceteris paribus, the RTI Act reduces
corruption in an average state by 18.5% points. To put this into perspective,
the RTI Act explains approximately 62% of the actual decline in corruption in
Bihar over the period 2005–2008.10 This is indeed a large effect.
Note that IV coefficient estimates are typically larger than the OLS
estimates. This is not surprising given that IV estimates are correcting for the
measurement-error-induced attenuation bias in OLS.
In column 4 we use per capita GDP growth instead of aggregate GDP
growth and our result remains unaffected. The evidence here supports the
hypothesis that rapidly growing per capita income also increases the personal
opportunity costs of corruption. Note that we also estimate the model using
5-year average growth rates instead of economic growth over the periods
2004–2005 and 2007–2008. Our results are robust to this test. Results are not
reported here but are available upon request. Column 2 reports the OLS
estimate of this model.
10The model predicts that corruption in Bihar should have declined by 18.5% points due to the
RTI Act. However, the actual decline is 30% points. Therefore, the predicted decline is 62% of the
actual.
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How good is our ln RAINit1 instrument? Panel B in Table 3 shows that it
is positively correlated with economic growth. Therefore it can serve as an
instrument provided it satisfies the exclusion restriction. In other words,
rainfall affects corruption exclusively through the economic growth channel.
However, rainfall may affect corruption through channels other than
economic growth. Poverty and inequality are such candidates. Rainfall may
lead to reduction in poverty, which may in turn lead to a reduction in
corruption. Better rainfall and better agriculture growth may also increase
inequality leading to an increase in corruption. In such situation, the
exclusion restriction would be violated.
In Table 4 we ask whether the effect of economic growth and law on
corruption is uniform across all sectors of the economy. In particular we look
at corruption in banking, land administration, police, education, water
supply, PDS, electricity, and hospitals. Indeed there are more sectors in an
economy that may have chronic corruption problem, and we admit that our
list is far from being comprehensive. However, it should be noted that our
study is the first attempt to look at corruption at a disaggregated level in India
using panel data and we are constrained by data availability. The results
indicate that the RTI Act had an impact on all sectors examined in this study.
However, the magnitude of the predicted decline varies from a 20.4% points
in policing to 6.2% points in the PDS. In contrast, the effect of economic
growth is far from being uniform. Banking, land administration, education,
electricity, and hospitals register a statistically significant negative effect of
economic growth on corruption. However, the effect is insignificant in case of
policing, water supply, and PDS.
In Table 5 we check whether there is a difference between actual
corruption experience and corruption perception. Indeed, we find that the
effect of economic growth on corruption is not uniform across actual
experience and perception. Panel A reports estimates with actual corruption
experience. Note that corruption experience here is the average of answers to
the questions on ‘direct experience of bribing’ and ‘using influence of a
middleman’. In addition to affecting overall corruption experience, economic
growth appears to reduce corruption experiences in banking, land adminis-
tration, education, electricity, and hospitals. The effects on police, water
supply, and the PDS is statistically insignificant. The observed pattern is very
similar to Table 4. This suggests that our corruption results reported in Tables
3 and 4 are driven by actual corruption experiences. Panel B reports estimates
with corruption perception. Note that corruption perception here is the
average of answers to the questions on ‘perception that a department is
corrupt’ and ‘perception that corruption has increased’. We notice that
economic growth has little effect on corruption perception and, in case of
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policing, it appears to have increased corruption perception.11 This is in line
with the view that perpetual pessimism with regards to government services
tends to shape corruption perception in developing economies, and any
impact that economic growth may have on actual corruption is often
overlooked. Our result is broadly in line with the findings of Olken (2009)
who also reports differences in corruption perception and corruption
experience in Indonesia, another developing economy.
The effect of RTI on corruption experience and corruption perception is
somewhat uniform. However, the magnitude of the effect varies across
sectors. We notice that the effect of RTI on corruption experience is greater
than its effect on corruption perception in case of overall corruption, land
administration, and PDS. In contrast, the reverse is observed in case of
banking, police, education, water supply, electricity, and hospitals.
In Table 6 we dissect corruption experience even further and examine the
effect of growth on bribes and the usage of middlemen separately. The results
are similar to Table 5, Panel A. In addition to affecting overall bribes,
economic growth appears to reduce bribes in banking, land administration,
education, electricity, and hospitals. However, the effects on police, water
supply, and PDS are statistically insignificant. The time dummy remains
significant throughout, highlighting the importance of RTI. The results are
similar for middlemen usage.
In Table 7 we add additional covariates into our specification to address
the issue of omitted variables. In column 1 we add literacy as an additional
control variable. The rationale is that literate citizens are relatively more
empowered to fight corruption. Our result survives. Poverty and inequality
may also increase corruption. To check whether this has any effect we add
Gini coefficient and poverty head count ratio as additional controls in
columns 2 and 3. Our result remains unaffected. Natural resources in general
and resource rent in particular may also increase corruption (see Ades and Di
Tella, 1999; Treisman, 2000; Isham et al., 2005; Bhattacharyya and Hodler,
2010). To check we add mining share of GDP and primary sector share of GDP
in columns 4 and 5 and our results are robust. High levels of government
expenditure may increase corruption as corrupt officials now have access to
more resources to usurp. It can also work in the opposite direction with the
government now able to engage more resources into auditing. Indeed we do
notice evidence in support of the latter in column 6 with state government
expenditure having a significant negative impact on corruption. This is in line
with Olken (2007) who shows that government audit reduces corruption in
11According to our estimates, economic growth reduced corruption perception only in
education.
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Indonesia. Nevertheless, more importantly our economic growth and law
results remain unaffected. In column 7 we test whether controlling for the
effect of media would alter our result. Media and an active civil society may
reduce corruption. We try to capture this effect using newspaper circulation.
Our main result survives. Column 8 tackles the view that telecommunication
revolution in India may have triggered this decline in corruption by
eliminating the middleman and reducing discretionary power of corrupt
officials. To capture this effect we use number of telephone exchanges as a
control variable, and our results survive.
Note that we perform two further tests. First, we test whether our results
are driven by influential observations. We identify influential observations
using Cook’s distance, DFITS, and Welsch distance formula and eliminate
them from the sample. Our result remains unaffected. Second, we estimate
the model using flood affected area, flood affected population, flood affected
crop area, and total number of flood affected households as alternative
instruments. Our results survive this test. Furthermore, note that the results
remain unaffected if these instruments are used in conjunction with rainfall
and the Sargan tests are satisfied. These results are not reported but are
available upon request.
Overall these empirical findings support our prediction that both
economic growth and RTI have negative impacts on corruption. However,
the effect of the RTI Act is more uniform than the effect of economic growth.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We study the causal impact of economic growth and law on corruption. Using
a panel dataset covering 20 Indian states and the years 2005 and 2008 we are
able to estimate the causal effects of economic growth and law on corruption.
To tackle endogeneity concerns we use rainfall as an instrument for economic
growth. Rainfall is a positive predictor of growth which is in line with the
view that rainfall contributes positively to economic growth. It also affects
corruption through the economic growth channel reasonably exclusively. To
capture the effect of law on corruption we use a time dummy and control for
other nationwide changes, which may be affecting corruption. Our results
indicate that economic growth reduces overall corruption as well as
corruption in banking, land administration, education, electricity, and
hospitals. However, growth has little impact on corruption perception. In
contrast the RTI negatively impacts both corruption experience and
corruption perception. Our basic result holds after controlling for state fixed
effects and various additional covariates, literacy, Gini coefficient, poverty
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Table 6: Effect of economic growth and law on bribes and middleman usage
Bribes
overall
Bribes
in banks
Bribes in
land admin.
Bribes in
police
Bribes in
education
Bribes
in water
Bribes
in PDS
Bribes in
electricity
Bribes in
hospitals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Panel A: LIML Fuller IV estimates with bribes
Economic growth [ y^it ] 0.93*** 0.87*** 1.26*** 0.14 0.83*** 0.69 0.11 1.17*** 1.69***
(0.26) (0.21) (0.39) (0.48) (0.09) (0.80) (0.37) (0.20) (0.31)
Year 2008 dummy 17.34*** 11.31*** 27.36*** 13.62*** 6.21*** 7.64** 10.39*** 11.68*** 7.14***
(3.65) (2.20) (4.65) (4.16) (1.92) (3.86) (3.32) (1.76) (2.05)
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06
Controls: State dummies
Instruments Log rainfall [ln RAINit1]
States 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Observations 40 40 40 39 40 39 40 40 40
Middleman
overall
Middleman
in banks
Middleman
in land admin.
Middleman
in police
Middleman
in education
Middleman
in water
Middleman
in PDS
Middleman
in electricity
Middleman
in hospitals
Panel B: LIML Fuller IV estimates with middlemen usage
Economic growth [ y^it ] 0.71** 0.62** 0.98** 0.13 0.71*** 0.49 0.09 0.97*** 1.80***
(0.32) (0.24) (0.32) (0.47) (0.14) (0.62) (0.28) (0.26) (0.38)
Year 2008 dummy 18.48*** 11.29*** 21.13*** 12.89*** 4.68*** 6.62** 10.86*** 11.09*** 7.48***
(2.13) (2.49) (4.32) (4.79) (1.91) (3.18) (3.76) (1.96) (2.65)
Endogeneity test (p-value) 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06
Controls: State dummies
Instruments Log rainfall [ln RAINit1]
States 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Observations 40 40 40 39 40 39 40 40 40
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster
standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All regressions are carried out with an intercept.
Sample years are 2005 and 2008. Fuller’s modified LIML estimator with a=1 (correction parameter proposed by Hausman et al., 2005) is used, which is robust to
weak instruments. Endogeneity test for one or more endogenous regressors p-values are reported. The null hypothesis is that the specified endogenous
variables can actually be treated as exogenous. Under the null the test statistic follows w2-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
regressors tested. Note that Sargan overidentification test is not reported as we have an exactly identified system.
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Table 7: Economic growth, law, and corruption: Robustness with additional covariates
Dependent variable: Corruption [cit]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
LIML Fuller IV estimates
Economic
growth [ y^it ]
0.34*** 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.48** 0.17*** 0.76*** 0.64*** 0.47*** 1.22**
(0.05) (0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.22) (0.02) (0.06) (0.21) (0.16) (0.67)
Year 2008
dummy
19.12***19.58*** 18.62*** 18.83*** 18.06*** 15.51*** 17.23*** 19.91*** 18.21*** 18.41***
(2.02) (1.75) (1.81) (2.27) (2.24) (2.18) (1.70) (3.19) (1.94) (1.94)
Endogeneity
test (p-value)
0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07
Controls: State dummies State Dummies
without AP, TN, WB
F
Additional
controls:
Literacy Gini coeffi-
cient
Poverty head
count ratio
Mining
share of
GDP
Primary sector
share of GDP
State government
expenditure***(-)
Newspaper
circulation
Telephone
exchange
F F
Instruments Log Rainfall [ln RAINit1]
States 18 20 20 20 20 19 18 14 20 20
Observations 36 40 40 40 40 38 36 28 40 40
Notes: ***, **, and * indicate significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively, against a two-sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster
standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All regressions are carried out with an intercept.
Sample years are 2005 and 2008. Fuller’s modified LIML estimator with a=1 (correction parameter proposed by Hausman et al., 2005) is used, which is robust
to weak instruments. Endogeneity test for one or more endogenous regressors p-values are reported. The null hypothesis is that the specified endogenous
variables can actually be treated as exogenous. Under the null the test statistic follows w2-distribution with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
regressors tested. Note that Sargan overidentification test is not reported as we have an exactly identified system. Also note that columns 9 and 10 report the
Hendry et al. (2004) procedure and the estimates without state dummies. These procedures are described in the section ‘Empirical strategy and data’.
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head count ratio, mining share of state GDP, primary sector share of state
GDP, state government expenditure as a share of state GDP, newspaper
circulation, and number of telephone exchanges. It is also robust to the use of
alternative instruments and outlier sensitivity tests.
Our results have important policy implications not just for India but also
for other comparable developing economies. Our findings imply that
economic forces have an important role in reducing corruption. Therefore,
macro policies to promote economic growth not only improve overall living
standards, but they also enhance the quality of public goods by reducing
corruption. This perhaps works through the following channels. First, it
provides the government with additional resources to fight corruption.
Second, it also reduces the incentives for corruption at the micro level by
raising the opportunity cost. More micro level research is certainly called for
to find out whether the data supports these conjectures.
Legislation such as the RTI Act in India is also important in curbing cor-
ruption. On the one hand it empowers citizens’ and breaks the information
monopoly of public officials. Therefore, it prevents corrupt public officials
from misusing information to advance their own interest. On the other hand, it
provides the government with more power and public support for conducting
top down audit of corrupt departments. There is evidence that the latter works
effectively in a developing economy environment (Olken, 2007).
Finally, more caution is required in the measurement of corruption. Our
results indicate that there is a fair bit of difference between actual corruption
experience and corruption perception in developing economies. Therefore over-
reliance on one or the other may be counterproductive. We do not stand alone
on this, as other studies also indicate that perception and actual corruption
tends to vary significantly (Olken, 2009). Measuring corruption appropriately in
our view is crucial in furthering our understanding of corruption.
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APPENDIX
Data description
Corruption [cit]: Corruption is computed using a two-step procedure. First, an
average is computed of the percentage of respondents answering yes to the
questions that they have direct experience of bribing, using a middleman,
perception that a department is corrupt, and perception that corruption
increased over time for eight different sectors: banking, land administration,
police, education, water, Public Distribution System (PDS), electricity, and
hospitals. Second, these averages are also averaged over all the eight sectors
to generate one observation per state and per time period. Higher value of the
corruption measure implies higher corruption.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Corruption in Banks [cit
BANKS]: Corruption computed in the same fashion as cit
but only for the banking sector.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Corruption in Land Administration [cit
LAND]: Corruption computed in the same
fashion as cit but only for the land administration sector.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Corruption in Police [cit
POLICE]: Corruption computed in the same fashion as cit
but only for police.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Corruption in Education [cit
EDUC]: Corruption computed in the same fashion as
cit but only for education sector.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Corruption in Water [cit
WATER]: Corruption computed in the same fashion as cit
but only for the water supply sector.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Corruption in PDS [cit
PDS]: Corruption computed in the same fashion as cit but
only for the public distribution system.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Corruption in Electricity [cit
ELEC]: Corruption computed in the same fashion as
cit but only for the electricity sector.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
S Bhattacharyya & R Jha
Growth, Law, and Corruption in India
24
Comparative Economic Studies
  
 
 
 
 
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
Corruption in Hospitals [cit
HOSP]: Corruption computed in the same fashion as
cit but only for hospitals.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Corruption Experience Measures: Corruption experience measures are the
average of answers to the questions on ‘direct experience of bribing’ and
‘using influence of a middleman’.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Corruption Perception Measures: Corruption perception measures are the
average of answers to the questions on ‘perception that a department is
corrupt’ and ‘perception that corruption has increased’.
Source: India Corruption Study 2005 and 2008, Transparency International.
Economic Growth [y^it]: Real growth rate in state GDP measured in 2009
constant prices.
Source: Planning Commission, Government of India.
Log Rainfall [ln RAINit1]: Log of rainfall across states measured in millimeters.
Source: Compendium of Environmental Statistics, Central Statistical Organi-
sation, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation.
Flood Area: Total area affected by flood in 1994 and 1996 measured in
millions of hectares.
Source: Central Water Commission, Government of India.
Flood Population: Total population affected by flood in 1994 and 1996
measured in millions.
Source: Central Water Commission, Government of India.
Flood Crop Area: Total crop area affected by flood in 1994 and 1996 measured
in millions of hectares.
Source: Central Water Commission, Government of India.
Flood Household: Total number of households affected by flood in 1994 and
1996 measured in millions of hectares.
Source: Central Water Commission, Government of India.
Literacy: Literacy rate for 2002 and 2005.
Source: Selected Socioeconomic Statistics India 2006, Central Statistical
Organization, Table 3.3.
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Gini Coefficient: Gini coefficient urban for the periods 1999–2000 and 2004–2005.
Source: Planning Commission.
Poverty Head Count Ratio: Percentage of population below poverty line (rural
and urban combined).
Source: Planning Commission.
Mining Share of GDP: Mining sector share of state GDP.
Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India.
Primary Sector Share of GDP: Primary sector share of state GDP.
Source: Handbook of Statistics on the Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India.
State Government Expenditure: State government expenditure as a proportion
of state GDP.
Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics, Ministry of Finance.
Newspaper Circulation: Number of registered newspapers in circulation.
Source: Registrar of Newspapers, Government of India.
Telephone Exchange: Number of telephone exchanges.
Source: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India.
Sample and state codes
Andhra Pradesh (AP), Assam (AS), Bihar (BH), Chhattisgarh (CG), Delhi
(DL), Gujarat (GJ), Haryana (HR), Himachal Pradesh (HP), Jammu and
Kashmir (JK), Jharkhand (JH), Karnataka (KT), Kerala (KL), Madhya Pradesh
(MP), Maharashtra (MH), Orissa (OS), Punjab (PJ), Rajasthan (RJ), Tamil
Nadu (TN), Uttar Pradesh (UP), West Bengal (WB).
Measurement error and instrumental variable estimation
Assume that the true relationship between corruption and growth is
cit ¼ ai þ dbt þ g1y^it þ eit . However the corruption variable has measurement
error so that ~cit ¼ cit þ yit (where yit is the time varying measurement error).
Because of measurement error we only observe ~cit and not true corruption
cit. So we estimate the model ~cit ¼ ai þ dbt þ g1y^it þ eit . While estimating
this model using fixed effects we would difference the data and get
S Bhattacharyya & R Jha
Growth, Law, and Corruption in India
26
Comparative Economic Studies
  
 
 
 
 
AU
TH
OR
 CO
PY
D~cit ¼ ~cit  ~cit1 ¼ dDbt þ g1Dy^it þ Deit . The parameter estimate of interest
would be, g^1 ¼
covðD~cit ;Dy^itÞ
varðDy^itÞ
¼ cov½DðcitþyitÞ;Dy^it varðDy^itÞ ¼
covðDcit ;Dy^itÞ
varðDy^itÞ
þ covðDyit ;Dy^itÞvarðDy^itÞ and
p lim g^1 ¼ g1 þ ðbiasÞ. Therefore, estimating the model using OLS would
yield biased estimates. If we use rainfall instrument Zit that is correlated
with Dy^it but orthogonal (or uncorrelated) to Dyit, Dbt and Deit then
cov(Zit, Dyit)¼ cov(Zit, Dbt)¼ cov(Zit, Deit)¼ 0. Then we would get, g^
IV
1 ¼
covðZit ;D~citÞ
covðZit ;Dy^itÞ
¼ cov½Zit ;DðcitþyitÞcovðZit ;Dy^itÞ ¼
covðZit ;DcitÞ
covðZit ;Dy^itÞ
þ covðZit ;DyitÞcovðZit ;Dy^itÞ ¼
covðZit ;DcitÞ
covðZit ;Dy^itÞ
and p lim g^IV1 ¼
p lim covðZit ;DcitÞcovðZit ;Dy^itÞ ¼ p lim
cov½Zit ;ðDbtþg1Dy^itþDeitÞ
covðZit ;Dy^itÞ
¼ g1 since cov(Zit, Dbt)¼ cov(Zit,
Deit)¼ 0. Therefore, the IV strategy could potentially remedy the measure-
ment error problem with 2008 corruption data.
S Bhattacharyya & R Jha
Growth, Law, and Corruption in India
27
Comparative Economic Studies
